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Quango	reform:	The	next	steps?	
The	Coalition	Government	elected	in	2010	in	the	UK	pursued	a	programme	of	quango	reform	focused	
on	reducing	the	number	and	expenditure	of	arm’s	length	bodies,	increasing	transparency,	improving	
accountability	and	maximising	efficiency	and	effectiveness.	 In	this	article	we	revisit	Flinders	and	
Skelchers’	2012	article	‘Shrinking	the	quango	state:	five	challenges	in	reforming	quangos’	to	assess	
progress	 to	 date	 and	 consider	 future	 challenges.	Drawing	 insights	 from	 the	UK	 programme	 of	
quango	 reform	 ,	as	well	as	 similar	developments	 in	 Ireland,	we	 identify	 five	new	 challenges	 for	
governments:	‘regulating’,	‘managing’,	‘reconciling’,	‘co‐ordinating’	and	‘reflecting’.	
Dr	Katharine	Dommett	 	and		 Dr	Muiris	MacCarthaigh	
Department	of	Politics,		 	 School	 of	 Politics,	 International	 Studies	 and	 Philosophy	
Elmfield,		 	 	 	 25	University	Square	
Northumberland	Road,	 	 Queen's	University	
Sheffield,	 	 	 	 Belfast	
S10	2TU	B	 	 	 	 BT7	1PB	
k.dommett@sheffield.ac.uk	 	 m.maccarthaigh@qub.ac.uk 
Bibliographical	Information	
Katharine	 Dommett	 is	 Lecturer	 in	 the	 Public	 Understanding	 of	 Politics	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Sheffield.	
Muiris	 MacCarthaigh	 is	 Lecturer	 in	 Politics	 and	 Public	 Administration	 at	 Queen’s	 University	
Belfast.	
Key	Words:	Quango;	Reform;	Ireland;	UK;	Government	
	
Introduction		
Ahead	of	 the	2010	general	 election	 significant	 attention	was	directed	 to	 the	 issue	of	 ‘quango’	
reform	 in	 the	 UK	 –	 a	 term	 that	 refers	 to	 bodies	 or	 ‘agencies’	 which	 sit	 at	 arm’s‐length	 from	
government	and	either	provide	public	services,	arbitrate	or	advise	the	government.1	Parties	from	
across	the	political	spectrum	proposed	a	radical	agenda	for	reform	that	would	variously	shrink	
the	 size	 of	 the	 state,	 reduce	 budgets,	 increase	 efficiency,	 improve	 accountability	 and	 enhance	
transparency.	The	ambition	of	and	consensus	for	change	in	this	area	was	clear.	Five	years	on	from	
2010	it	appears	that	the	coalition	government	have	had	significant	success	in	inducing	reform	
(Cabinet	Office,	 2014;	Dommett,	 Flinders,	 Skelcher	 and	Tonkiss,	 2014).	The	number	of	public	
bodies	 has	 fallen,	 financial	 savings	 have	 been	made	 and	 new	measures	 for	 transparency	 and	
accountability	have	been	introduced.	And	unlike	the	2010	campaign,	quango	culls	did	not	feature	
prominently	in	the	2015	election	campaign	debates.	
                                                            
1	The	term	quango	is	utilized	here	interchangeably	with	public	body	and	agency	–	while	there	is	much	
terminological	debate,	quangos	refer	to	bodies	operating	outside	of	departmental	structures.	
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On	this	measure	it	appears	that	the	government	has	been	successful	in	translating	its	ambition	
into	 practice,	 but	 the	 process	 has	 been	 far	 from	 smooth	with	Minister	 for	 the	 Cabinet	Office,	
Francis	Maude	arguing	‘[i]t	wasn’t	easy	–	it	was	prosaic,	painstaking	work	but	together	we	saw	it	
though’	 (Maude,	 2014).	 In	 2012	 Matthew	 Flinders	 and	 Chris	 Skelcher	 picked	 up	 on	 these	
challenges	in	this	journal,	identifying	five	limitations	to	the	coalition’s	agenda;	citing	difficulties	
in	‘mapping’,	‘assessing’,	‘reconfiguring’,	‘saving’	and	‘accounting’	(Flinders	and	Skelcher	2012).	In	
this	article	we	revisit	the	issue	of	quango	reform	to	explore	the	progress	that	has	been	made,	to	
map	the	barriers	 to	reform	and	to	consider	 issues	 for	 the	 future	(within	and	beyond	the	UK).	
Through	 this	 process	 we	 identify	 five	 new	 challenges	 captured	 by	 the	 terms	 ‘regulating’,	
‘managing’,	‘reconciling’,	‘co‐ordinating’	and	‘reflecting’.	
Such	 inquiry	 is	 vital	 because,	 as	 Flinders	 and	 Skelcher	 pointed	 out,	 quangos	 remain	 ‘an	
indispensible	 part	 of	 the	 state’	 (2012,	 p.327).	 Even	 the	 coalition	 government,	 who	 were	
committed	 to	 reducing	 the	 number	 and	 expenditure	 of	 public	 bodies,	 have	 created	 new	
organisations	 including	 the	 Office	 for	 Budget	 Responsibility,	 the	 National	 Crime	 Agency	 and,	
perhaps	most	notably,	NHS	England	–	which	in	2014	received	£95,873,000,000	in	funding	from	
the	UK	Government.	Quangos	are	 therefore	here	 to	 stay	and	will	 require	ongoing	 reform	and	
improvement.	This	point	has	been	made	by	Francis	Maude	who	asserted	that	‘[o]ften	the	lot	of	
the	reformer	is	to	be	asked	by	people	when	it’s	going	to	end	–	but	it	will	never	end’	(2014).	From	
his	perspective,	the	Government:		
should	always	be	re‐examining	how	we	deliver	services	because	it’s	always	
possible	 to	 find	new	and	better	ways	of	doing	 things.	All	organisations	are	
either	 getting	 better	 or	 they’re	 getting	worse.	 There’s	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 an	
organisation	in	a	steady	state	–	if	you	think	it’s	in	a	steady	state	it’s	getting	
worse	(Maude,	2014).	
It	is	unclear,	however,	what	issues	future	reform	should	address.	In	considering	this	question	this	
article	examines	the	UK	quango	reform	agenda,	and	draws	insights	from	the	Irish	case	where	a	
parallel	programme	of	agency	reform	has	emerged	since	2008.	Using	comparative	examples	and	
information	 from	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 with	 civil	 servants	 in	 London	 and	 Dublin,	 we	
explore	progress	to	date	and,	based	on	these	examples,	identify	five	challenges	that	politicians	
pursuing	quango	reform	in	the	UK	and	elsewhere	need	to	consider.		
Success	since	2010?		
Quango	reform	is	a	perennial	concern	of	governments.	Pledges	to	reduce	the	size	and	scope	of	the	
state	–	and	the	waste	that	is	often	associated	with	such	agendas	‐	are	far	from	unpopular.	Indeed,	
parties	of	all	colours	regularly	compete	to	demonstrate	their	anti‐quango	credentials;	unveiling	
new	programmes	of	reform	designed	to	bring	about	change	in	this	area	as	part	of	efficiency	and	
cost‐savings	measures.	Ahead	of	the	2010	general	election	this	spirit	was	particularly	evident	in	
the	UK	 as	 the	Conservatives,	 Labour	 and	 Liberal	Democrats	 announced	plans	 to	 scrap	public	
bodies	and	reform	the	governance	of	the	state.	Once	in	office	the	Conservative‐Liberal	Democrat	
coalition	pursued	 this	 agenda	under	 the	 leadership	of	Minister	 for	 the	Cabinet	Office,	 Francis	
Maude.	A	governmental	review	conducted	over	5	months	identified	904	individual	organisations	
and	proposals	for	reform	were	swiftly	agreed	between	departmental	ministers	and	the	Cabinet	
Office	(Cabinet	Office,	2011).	This	led	to	a	wide	ranging	programme	of	reform	in	which	34%	of	
quangos	were	scheduled	for	abolition,	merger	or	reform	(Cabinet	Office,	2014b),	new	‘triennial	
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reviews’	were	introduced	to	review	bodies’	function	and	governance	(Dommett,	2014),	and	the	
sponsorship	 of	 these	 bodies	 was	 overhauled	 (Flinders	 and	 Tonkiss,	 2014).	 This	 approach	
accorded	 with	 the	 rationale	 that	 reforms	 were	 not	 about	 structures	 but	 about	 services,	 and	
accordingly	 focused	 on	 increasing	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 in	 government	 (For	 a	 more	
detailed	account	of	the	reform	programme	see:	Dommett	and	Flinders,	2014a;	Dommett,	Flinders,	
Skelcher	and	Tonkiss,	2014).		
Five	years	on	from	the	2010	general	election	the	success	of	the	reform	agenda	has	been	attested	
in	the	most	recent	Public	Bodies	report	published	in	November	2014	–	an	annual	account	of	the	
size	 of	 the	 public	 bodies	 landscape	 (which	 looks	 exclusively	 at	 one	 category	 of	 quango,	Non‐
Departmental	Public	Bodies	(NDPBs).	This	report	gathers	data	on	UK‐wide	quangos,	as	opposed	
to	those	within	devolved	administrations,	and	hence	does	not	consider	bodies	which	solely	relate	
to	 Scotland,	 Wales	 and	 Northern	 Ireland.	 In	 this	 report	 the	 Cabinet	 Office	 has	 highlighted	 a	
reduction	in	the	number	of	public	bodies	by	over	285,	with	more	than	185	abolished,	and	over	
165	bodies	merged	into	fewer	than	70.	As	of	December	2014	over	95%	of	planned	abolitions	and	
mergers	have	been	completed,	progress	the	National	Audit	Office	had	described	as	‘good’	and	as	
evidence	of	‘significant	rationalisation	of	the	public	bodies	landscape’	(Cabinet	Office,	2014a,	p.4).	
Financially	the	reform	of	public	bodies	is	also	reported	to	be	on	track	to	exceed	£2.6	billion	in	
cumulative	 spending	 reductions	 by	 the	 end	 of	 March	 2015	 (Cabinet	 Office,	 2014a,	 p.4)	 with	
reductions	 of	 £2	 billion	 already	 achieved	 between	 2010	 and	 March	 2014.	 In	 addition	 the	
government	has	claimed	increases	in	transparency,	asserting	that	90%	or	more	of	NDPBs	now	
make	more	information	such	as	annual	reports,	biographies	of	board	members	and	details	of	how	
to	make	complaints	and	freedom	of	information	requests	publically	available	on	their	websites	
(Cabinet	Office,	2014a,	p.4).	Accountability	is	also	reported	to	have	been	improved	by	moves	to	
bring	the	functions	of	over	75	bodies	‘closer	to	democratically	elected	representatives’	(Ibid).		
On	these	measures	the	reform	agenda	appears	to	have	been	a	significant	success.		And	yet	from	
the	outset	commentators	have	outlined	the	 limitations	of	 these	reforms.	An	 initial	assessment	
made	in	2012	by	Flinders	and	Skelcher	highlighted	five	reasons	for	caution	in	interpreting	the	
public	bodies	reform	agenda,	which	are	worth	recounting.	First,	at	the	level	of	‘mapping’,	Flinders	
and	Skelcher	emphasized	that	whilst	ambitious	in	its	focus	on	NDPBs,	the	coalition	government’s	
reform	 agenda	 had	 neglected	 significant	 numbers	 of	 other	 ‘quangos’.	 Executive	 Agencies	 and	
other	 ‘off	 stage’	 bodies	 (which	 possess	 the	 characteristics	 of	 quangos	 but	 are	 not	 formally	
classified	as	such	due	to	quirks	of	history)	were	not	considered	and	hence	the	scope	of	reform	
was	limited	–	raising	questions	about	the	extent	to	which	it	would	produce	fundamental	change.	
Second,	 the	 2012	 article	 showed	 there	was	 inconsistency	 in	 ‘assessing’	 the	 quango	 state	with	
departments	adopting	different	approaches	 in	the	application	and	definition	of	 the	three	tests	
provided	by	the	Cabinet	Office	as	the	basis	for	assessing	quangos	future.	For	this	reason	it	was	
argued	that	the	2010	reform	agenda	did	not	appear	to	be	rectifying	inconsistencies	but	rather	
added	new	ambiguities	to	the	quango	landscape.	In	addition,	Flinders	and	Skelcher	highlighted	
questions	concerning	the	form	of	change.		
Under	the	third	heading	of	‘reconfiguring’	the	authors	drew	attention	to	the	coalition’s	emphasis	
on	 small,	 low	budget	 advisory	 bodies;	 detailing	 how	 ‘the	 vast	majority	 of	 large	 and	powerful	
quangos	have	not	been	affected’	(2012,	p.331).	As	such	their	article	raised	questions	about	the	
extent	 of	 change	 actually	 pursued	 that	were	 linked	 to	 the	 fourth	 challenge:	 ‘saving’.	 Quoting	
reports	from	the	National	Audit	Office	and	Public	Administration	Select	Committee	it	was	argued	
that	the	government	had	failed	to	grasp	the	cost	of	reform,	raising	questions	about	the	validity	of	
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the	claim	to	achieve	£2.6	billion	in	savings	by	2015	(Flinders	and	Skelcher,	2012,	p.332).	Finally,	
the	2012	article	raised	questions	about	‘accounting’,	probing	the	extent	to	which	reform	would	
produce	 the	 desired	 improvements	 in	 accountability.	 The	 authors	 examined	 the	 impact	 of	
drawing	 functions	 closer	 to	 ministers,	 discussing	 how	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 can	
actually	be	undermined	by	such	measures	by	reducing	opportunities	for	external	scrutiny.	In	this	
initial	 assessment	 these	 challenges	 led	 Flinders	 and	 Skelcher	 to	 argue	 that	 ‘developments	 in	
shrinking	the	quango	state	since	May	2010	are	certainly	much	more	than	a	barbeque’	but	that	
they	are	‘less	than	the	bonfire	hoped	for	by	some’	(2012,	p.335).		
As	time	has	passed	it	has	become	clear	that	Flinders	and	Skelcher’	analysis	accurately	captured	
the	challenges	of	effecting	reform.	Whilst	significant	progress	has	been	made,	concerns	about	the	
size,	scope	and	capacity	of	the	quango	state	remain.	Indeed	Flinders	and	Skelcher	themselves,	in	
an	updated	analysis	of	reforms,	have	argued	that	whilst	progress	has	been	made	the	reforms	were	
limited	because	‘at	the	level	of	metagovernance	[the	Coalition]	refused	to	adopt	‘a	more	strategic	
approach’	and	focused	instead	on	‘just	one	layer	(or	species)	of	arm’s‐length	body,	without	any	
clear	rationale	for	(a)	why	similar	measures	weren’t	similarly	appropriate	for	other	layers,	or	(b)	
how	the	centripetal	 logic	of	 the	 ‘public	bodies	 reform	programme’	can	be	reconciled	with	 the	
centrifugal	 logic	 of	 reforms	 in	 other	 sectors	 (most	 notably,	 but	 not	 exclusively,	 in	 the	 health	
sector)’	 (Dommett,	 Flinders,	 Skelcher	 and	 Tonkiss,	 2014,	 p.141).	 Elsewhere	 the	 Public	
Administration	Select	Committee	(2014)	has	levelled	similar	criticisms,	asserting	that:	
that	arm’s‐length	Government	is	confused	and	opaque.	Organisational	forms	
and	names	are	inconsistent.	Most	public	bodies	answer	to	Ministers	but	some	
are	directly	accountable	to	Parliament.	There	is	no	agreement	on	how	many	
types	 of	 body	 exist.	 There	 are	 overlaps	 and	 blurring	 between	 categories.	
Accountability	 arrangements	 and	 reforms	 so	 far	 have	 been	 ad	 hoc	 (Public	
Administration	Select	Committee,	2014,	p.3).	
The	 Institute	 for	Government	has	voiced	similar	concerns	arguing	that	whilst	 there	have	been	
some	positive	steps	the	fundamental	problems	evident	in	the	quango	landscape	in	2010	have	not	
been	resolved.	In	their	analysis	‘there	are	at	least	11	different	types	of	ALB’,	a	situation	that	‘leads	
to	confusion	about	roles	and	responsibilities	between	organisations’	and	creates	variation	in	the	
relationships	between	departments	and	the	ALBs	that	they	sponsor	that	varies	considerably	in	
quality	(2015,	p.1).	On	this	evidence	it	appears	that,	notwithstanding	the	reform	successes	to	date,	
the	problems	cited	by	Flinders	and	Skelcher	continue	to	be	relevant.	
Quango	reforms	in	Ireland	
The	context	of	quango	reform	 in	 Ireland	bears	similarities	 to	 the	British	case	(unsurprisingly,	
given	 its	 similar	 administrative	 and	 legal	 system),	 but	 also	 some	 important	 differences	 from	
which	lessons	may	be	gleaned.	Whilst	a	long	history	of	anti‐quango	rhetoric	and	reform	can	be	
traced	in	the	UK	(Flinders,	Dommett	and	Tonkiss,	2014)	interest	in	Ireland	in	this	matter	is	more	
recent.	Indeed,	political	attention	was	not	directed	exclusively	to	this	issue	until	the	Organisation	
for	Economic	Co‐operation	and	Development	(OECD)	(2008)	conducted	a	review	into	the	Irish	
public	 service.	Their	 report	noted	 the	variety	of	 governance	and	accountability	arrangements	
Irish	quangos	were	subject	to	and	recommended	a	‘new	governance	framework	in	respect	of	State	
agencies’	 and	 ‘a	 detailed	 review	of	 existing	 agencies	 to	 identify	 opportunities	 to	 amalgamate,	
rationalize	and	make	greater	use	of	shared	services’	(2008,	p.40).		
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In	the	wake	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	and	suddenly	faced	with	an	enormous	budgetary	deficit,	
quango	rationalisation	became	a	financial	rather	than	administrative	modernisation	issue.	The	
then	Fianna	Fáil‐led	government	announced	plans	in	an	emergency	budget	in	late	2008	to	‘reduce	
the	number	of	State	bodies	and	agencies	by	forty‐one,	and	to	streamline	certain	other	functions’	
(Lenihan,	2008).	As	per	the	UK,	deciding	on	what	to	include	in	the	Irish	agency	population	proved	
problematic	(MacCarthaigh,	2012a).	However,	adopting	a	broad	definition	of	agencies	(to	include,	
for	 example,	 commercial	 state‐owned	 enterprises),	 a	 longitudinal	 database	 of	 Irish	 agencies	
estimated	a	peak	of	almost	360	agencies	was	reached	in	2008,	meaning	the	initial	reduction	target	
was	 approximately	 12%	of	 the	 agency	population.	An	 initial	 rash	of	 agency	 terminations	 and	
departmental	absorptions	in	2008	and	2009	–	also	largely	small	advisory	bodies	with	minimum	
budgetary	spend	–	resulted	in	only	15	of	the	41	bodies	closing,	and	with	political	energies	focused	
in	 the	 state’s	 economic	 survival,	 by	 early	 2011	 the	 pace	 of	 reform	 had	 slowed	 considerably	
(MacCarthaigh,	2014a).		
Renewed	impetus	was	given	to	the	quango	cull	by	a	new	coalition	government	that	took	office	in	
Ireland	in	March	2011	with	a	strong	mandate	for	reform.	In	a	Public	Service	Reform	Plan	published	
in	November	the	Minister	with	responsibility	for	the	new	Department	of	Public	Expenditure	and	
Reform	(DPER)	announced	that	it	was	proceeding	‘with	the	rationalisation	of	48	Bodies	by	the	
end	of	2012	 [and	nominating]	 another	46	Bodies	 for	 critical	 review	by	 the	end	of	 June	2012’	
(DPER,	2011,	p.52).	The	plan	attested	that	the	government	would	‘further	rationalise	the	number	
of	State	Agencies	and	Departmental	bodies	to	streamline	service	delivery,	 increase	democratic	
accountability	 and	 secure	 €20	 million	 in	 enhanced	 service	 efficiencies	 and	 value‐for‐money’	
(DPER,	2011,	p.9).	Additional	measures	including	“sunset	clauses”	when	new	bodies	are	created,	
annual	reviews	of	the	continuing	business	case	for	all	significant	state	bodies,	and	a	requirement	
for	robust	service	level	agreements	between	departments	and	state	bodies	were	also	introduced	
(DPER,	2011,	Appendix	II,	p.2).	These	plans	were	pursued	in	accordance	with	a	desire	to	make	
the	agency	sector	a	‘more	efficient	and	responsive	sector	in	delivering	on	their	service	objectives	
in	the	coming	years’	(DPER,	2014a).	Despite	this	new	energy	for	rationalizations,	by	late	2012	a	
review	by	the	Department	noted	that	progress	was	much	slower	than	expected	and	only	a	third	
of	the	agencies	due	for	abolition	that	year	would	be	gone	by	year‐end.		
Progress	achieved	by	the	Irish	government	in	effecting	change	has	therefore	been	mixed.	Official	
statistics	 reveal	 there	 has	 been	 a	 reduction	 in	 numbers	 and	 financial	 savings	 with	 DPER	
concluding	that	‘measures	affecting	more	than	90%	of	the	bodies	to	be	merged	or	rationalized	
are	 completed,	 and	when	 the	 remainder	 are	 fully	 completed	 there	will	 be	 181	 fewer	 bodies	
operating	 in	 the	 Irish	 Public	 Service	 than	 in	 2011	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 measures	 taken	 in	 the	
programme’	(DPER,	2014b,	p.1).	And	a	longitudinal	perspective	(Figure	1)	shows	that	there	has	
been	a	year‐on‐year	reduction	in	the	agency	population	since	2008.	However,	detailed	analysis	
reveals	that	beneath	these	headline	figures	many	of	the	challenges	highlighted	by	Flinders	and	
Skelcher	are	evident.	These	figures	obscure	the	fact	that	in	large	part	the	reduction	in	numbers	
was	achieved	through	the	reform	of	sub‐national	agencies,	meaning	that	the	number	of	national‐
level	agencies	with	more	substantial	budgets	and	remit	reformed	was	modest.	They	also	shield	
the	 fact	 that	 new	 agencies	 continued	 to	 be	 created	 by	 the	 government,	 showing	 the	 ongoing	
relevance	of	this	form	of	organisation.		
Figure	1:	Public	Organisations	in	Ireland	(including	Ministerial	Departments)	1922‐2014	
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Source:	Hardiman	et	al.	2015,	www.isad.ie					
In	addition	it	is	clear	that	whilst	pursuing	reform	the	government’s	efforts	to	induce	change	have	
been	frustrated.	Having	set	a	target	of	€20	million	in	financial	savings,	the	government	report	
identified	actual	annual	savings	of	over	€15	million	to	date	–	a	shortfall	attributed	to	‘the	simple	
fact	–	a	feature	of	the	private	sector	too	–	that	some	mergers	have	upfront	costs	or	at	least	require	
time	 to	 fully	extract	efficiencies’	 (DPER,	2014b,	p.2).	Many	 terminated	 Irish	agencies	also	had	
small	budgets.	This	indicates	that	similar	questions	about	savings	and	reconfiguration	are	evident	
in	the	Irish	case,	as	are	concerns	over	accountability	and	mapping.		
Barriers	to	reform	
The	challenges	experienced	in	the	UK,	aligned	with	those	of	the	Irish	case,	make	it	interesting	to	
consider	the	nature	of	the	barriers	encountered	by	government	officials,	and	bring	two	variables	
to	the	fore:	legislative	process	and	capacity.		
Legislative	Process	
The	 first	 challenge	 concerns	 the	 process	 of	 effecting	 reform.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 vast	
majority	of	initial	reforms	pursued	in	the	UK	and	Ireland	were	of	small	advisory	or	sub‐national	
bodies	that	can	be	reformed	by	ministerial	order	or	through	the	passage	of	(usually)	simplistic	
legislative	changes.	These	changes	bring	about	a	swift	reduction	in	the	number	of	bodies	and	are	
far	easier	to	achieve	than	change	to	more	legislatively	complex	organisations,	making	change	of	
this	form	attractive	to	governments	
The	 process	 of	 bringing	 about	 reform	 can	 therefore	 be	 frustrated	 by	 bodies’	 legislative	
foundation.	Governments	are	often	required	to	unpick	multiple	pieces	of	legislation	in	order	to	
close	quangos,	a	process	that	is	resource	and	time	intensive.	In	the	UK	intended	reforms	to	the	
Forestry	Commission	were	frustrated	by	the	legislative	complexity	of	reforming	a	body	that	had	
foundations	in	numerous	pieces	of	legislation	dating	back	to	1919	(Interview	No.	1).	Whilst	in	
Ireland	one	departmental	employee	reflected	that	‘there	is	a	big	structural	barrier	to	reform	as	
the	effort	which	needs	to	be	expended	is	huge’	(Interview	No.	2).	In	some	cases,	this	has	led	to	
efforts	to	starve	agencies	of	staffing	and	budget	resources	–	aiming	to	facilitate	closure	through	
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stealth	rather	than	direct	action.	These	structural	requirements	are	seen	to	have	frustrated	the	
process	of	bringing	about	change	in	both	countries.		
In	addition,	bodies’	legislative	foundation	raised	a	second	difficulty	concerning	scrutiny.	Both	the	
UK	and	Irish	governments	experienced	barriers	to	reform	through	central	oversight	procedures.	
To	 pursue	 reform	 in	 the	 UK	 the	 Government	 passed	 the	 Public	 Bodies	 Act	 2011,	 a	 piece	 of	
enabling	legislation	under	which	Orders	for	specific	reforms	could	be	tabled.	Orders	were	subject	
to	an	‘enhanced	affirmative	procedure’	that	permitted	up	to	60	days	for	further	consideration	of	
a	proposal.	For	the	vast	majority	of	orders	laid	under	the	Act	limited	delays	occurred,	however,	
in	certain	instances	changes	were	substantially	delayed	by	the	Parliamentary	process,	with	the	
Secondary	 Legislation	 Scrutiny	 Committee	 raising	 concerns	 over,	 amongst	 other	 factors,	 the	
robustness	 of	 the	 Government's	 case	 for	 individual	 orders	 (2011,	 p.3).	 The	 impact	 of	 such	
scrutiny	was	particularly	apparent	in	the	case	of	the	Administrative	Justice	and	Tribunals	Council	
(AJTC).	The	order	for	the	abolition	of	this	body	was	first	laid	on	December	2012	but,	following	
numerous	critical	reports	from	both	Houses	of	Parliament,	the	AJTC	was	not	formally	abolished	
until	August	19th	2013	(Skelcher,	2015).	 In	Ireland,	many	of	 the	more	substantial	 Irish	agency	
mergers	 and	 absorptions	 (and	 particularly	 those	 involving	 organisations	 with	 full	 statutory	
autonomy)	were	only	realised	by	means	of	bespoke	pieces	of	legislation	which	were	developed	
seriatum.	The	development	and	parliamentary	progress	of	the	legislation	added	further	to	delays,	
hindering	departmental	efforts	to	effect	reform.	
Capacity		
In	addition	to	the	problems	derived	from	process	these	cases	also	show	challenges	arising	from	
a	lack	of	capacity	to	implement	decisions.	In	both	the	UK	and	Irish	cases	reforms	have	proceeded	
at	a	time	of	austerity,	being	implemented	alongside	wider	programmes	of	civil	service	reform	and	
retrenchment.	 In	 the	 UK	 context	 there	 are	 indications	 that	 this	 has	 limited	 the	 capacity	 of	
departments	to	implement	new	processes	(for	example	in	relation	to	triennial	reviews	(Dommett,	
2014))	as	resources	and	staff	capacity	have	been	lacking	(Interview	No.	3;	No,	4).	The	pressure	of	
fiscal	retrenchment	is	also	keenly	apparent	in	the	Irish	case	where	departmental	budgets	have	
been	 cut	 by	 as	 much	 as	 40%	 in	 some	 cases,	 and	 DPER	 has	 relied	 on	 already	 hard‐pressed	
Departments	 to	 engage	 in	 difficult	 agency	 termination	 strategies	 for	 which	 they	 had	 little	
resource.	This	has	placed	pressure	on	departments	and	has	limited	their	capacity	to	implement	
change.	In	part	these	challenges	derive	from	a	freeze	on	recruitment	within	departments	from	
2008,	but	in	the	main	they	stem	from	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	staff	within	departments	and	
agencies.	In	one	high	profile	department	the	number	of	staff	was	reduced	from	around	800	to	525	
and	yet	new	responsibilities	were	added	–	meaning	that	departmental	capacity	to	pursue	change	
was	 stretched.	 In	 practice	 this	 has	 created	 difficulties	 implementing	 and	 enforcing	 the	 new	
requirements	outlined	by	DPER	–	a	point	recognized	by	DPER	officials	who	reported	 ‘you	can	
issue	all	the	guidance	you	want	but	there	is	no	point	if	it	isn’t	implemented	fully’	(Interview	No.5).		
The	issue	of	capacity	is	also	keenly	evident	in	relation	to	the	oversight	of	agency	reform.	In	the	
UK	the	Cabinet	Office	expanded	the	public	bodies	team	to	oversee	the	reform	process	(Dommett	
and	Flinders,	2014b),	but	in	Ireland	central	provision	was	provided	by	officials	who	were	also	
charged	with	other	major	responsibilities.	The	lack	of	central	capacity	limited	the	ability	of	the	
Irish	Government	to	oversee	reform	to	ensure	that	progress	was	made	and	that	new	practices	
were	implemented	in	a	uniform	manner.	In	relation	to	guidance	for	setting	up	new	bodies,	for	
example,	 despite	 a	 clear	 pledge	 to	 implement	 sunset	 clauses	 made	 by	 central	 government,	
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officials	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 enforce	 the	 implementation	 of	 this	 practice	 in	 departments,	
resulting	in	lack	of	uniformity	in	the	application	of	this	ideal.		
These	indicators	suggest	that	bringing	about	change	is	by	no	means	simple	and	that	efforts	to	
reform	quangos	are	likely	to	be	frustrated	by	the	complexities	of	the	political	system.	Against	this	
backdrop	it	is	interesting	to	consider	the	form	ongoing	change	in	this	area	may	take	and	the	new	
challenges	that	are	likely	to	be	encountered.	We	argue	that	while	substantial	reform	progress	has	
been	made	which	address	the	five	challenges	Flinders	and	Skelcher	suggested	for	a	programme	
of	 rationalisation	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 the	 number	 and	 cost	 of	 quangos,	 the	 future	 evolution	 of	
quango	reform	should	be	informed	by	a	new	set	of	priority	challenges.	We	explore	each	of	these	
under	the	headings	‘regulating’,	‘managing’,	‘reconciling’,	‘co‐ordinating’	and	reflecting’	(see	Table	
1,	below).	
Five	Future	Challenges	for	Quango	Reform:	
Regulating	
The	‘terra	incognita’	of	the	quango	landscape	identified	by	Flinders	and	Skelcher	in	their	2012	
article	and	also	evident	in	Ireland	pre‐reform	(MacCarthaigh,	2012b)	has	been	(partially)	tackled	
by	the	process	of	‘mapping’	that	occurred	in	both	countries	and	steps	have	been	taken	in	both	
contexts	 to	 control	 agency	 establishment	 and	monitor	performance.	 In	 the	UK	 and	 in	 Ireland	
departments	need	to	present	a	robust	business	case	when	proposing	to	establish	new	agencies	
(DPER,	2014b;	Cabinet	Office,	2012),	a	requirement	that	has	limited	the	number	of	new	bodies	
created.	In	addition	both	countries	have	established	processes	for	more	regular	periodic	review	
with	the	implementation	of	Triennial	Reviews	in	the	UK	and	more	routine	performance/service‐
level	agreements	between	agencies	and	their	parent	departments	in	Ireland.		
Such	 developments	 indicate	 fundamental	 change	 that	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 positive	 long‐term	
implications	 for	 the	 regulation	 of	 agency	numbers	 and	 functions.	However,	 there	 are	 notable	
limitations	to	the	current	approach	adopted	in	the	UK	that	have	wider	relevance	for	countries	
conducting	quango	reform.	Whilst	NDPBs	are	now	subject	to	greater	regulation,	there	are	a	raft	
of	new	bodies	such	as	mutuals	and	charities	that	deliver	functions	previously	performed	by	public	
bodies	but	are	not	subject	to	the	above	regulatory	processes.	This	indicates	room	for	potential	
inconsistency	 in	 regulating	 the	 arm’s‐length	 state	 as	 new	 models	 of	 service	 delivery	 are	
introduced.	It	also	poses	challenges	in	terms	of	resource,	with	interviewees	expressing	doubt	as	
to	whether	departments	are	‘sufficiently	resourced	to	support	the	ministers	in	decision	making’	
even	before	the	latest	round	of	departmental	cuts	(Interview	No.	6).	
	Managing	
A	more	regulated	agency	environment	implies	that	more	consistent	and	meaningful	management	
or	 ‘sponsorship’	 of	 agencies	 will	 be	 required	 by	 parent	 department	 and	 central	 authorities.	
Already	in	the	UK	case,	there	have	been	progressive	steps	taken	to	recognize	agency	sponsorship	
as	a	distinctive	skill	with	the	suite	of	civil	service	competencies	(Cabinet	Office,	2014;	Flinders	
and	Tonkiss,	2015).	This	goes	some	way	in	resolving	the	tension	between	parent	departments	
and	agencies	 identified	by	the	Institute	of	Government	(2012).	Yet,	 to	ensure	the	efficient	and	
effective	management	of	agencies	such	practices	will	need	to	be	embraced	by	departments	and	
deployed	in	a	manner	that	balances	central	control	and	agency	autonomy	to	ensure	that	agencies	
are	able	to	carry	out	their	statutory	duties.		
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Reconciling	
The	rhetoric	of	‘bonfires’,	‘culls’	and	‘quangocide’	has	not	served	agencies	or	their	departments	
well.	 The	 portrayal	 of	 agencies	 as	 unnecessary	 or	 undesirable	 appendages	 to	 an	 otherwise	
rational	central	administration	undermines	the	role	and	extension	of	state	capacity	they	offer.		In	
a	similar	vein,	the	plea	for	uniformity	in	how	quangos	are	governed	and	held	to	account	across	
government	 fails	 to	 appreciate	 that	 there	 are	 benefits	 to	 diversity	 and	 flexibility	 in	 agency	
governance.			
The	 global	 financial	 crisis	 has	 resulted	 in	 tensions	 between	 political	 executives	 and	
administrative	systems	as	the	former	have	sought	to	reduce	the	cost	and	size	of	the	latter,	with	
considerable	changes	to	the	public	service	‘bargain’	(Lodge	and	Hood,	2011).	In	pursuing	further	
agency	reform,	a	process	of	reconciliation	between	political	and	administrative	actors	is	required	
that	 re‐establishes	 a	 sense	 of	 common	 purpose	 and	 recognizes	 the	 vital	 role	 of	 agencies	 in	
delivering	public	services.	This	approach	appears	to	be	emerging	in	the	UK	where	the	notion	of	a	
‘partnership’	(Maude,	2014)	between	agencies,	departments	and	central	government	is	seen	to	
be	key	to	future	reform,	but	it	is	an	approach	that	has	wider	relevance	beyond	this	immediate	
context.		
Co‐ordinating	
The	process	of	administrative	landscape	clearing	that	formed	part	of	the	justification	for	agency	
rationalisation	strategies	post	2008	has	resulted	in	a	smaller	but	more	diverse	range	of	public	
service	organisations.	In	many	cases,	hybrid	and	multi‐functional	organisations	now	exist	arising	
from	mergers	of	previously	separate	entities	under	the	aegis	of	different	departments.		As	part	of	
cost	reduction	strategies,	there	has	also	been	an	increase	in	the	use	of	stand‐alone	‘shared	service	
centres’	which	perform	back‐office	and	corporate	processing	functions	previously	performed	by	
multiple	agencies	simultaneously	(Elston,	2014;	MacCarthaigh	2014b,).	
Traditional	 co‐ordination	 challenges	 such	 as	 those	 between	 CEOs,	 boards,	 sponsoring	
departments	and	Ministers	remain.	 In	the	post‐rationalisation	environment,	however,	new	co‐
ordination	challenges	have	emerged:	
‐ Between	agencies,	parent	departments	and	shared	service	centres	
‐ Between	departments	who	share	responsibility	for	hybrid	or	multi‐functional	agencies	
In	 some	 respects,	 therefore,	 the	 process	 of	 agency	 rationalisation	 has	 led	 to	 a	more	 complex	
environment,	with	 increased	number	 of	 actors	 and	veto	points.	 Ensuring	 coordination	 across	
these	actors	will	therefore	be	necessary	as	part	of	any	future	reform	agenda.		
Reflecting	
Finally,	 the	 considerable	 energy	 and	 resource	 that	 has	 been	 committed	 to	 the	 agency	
rationalisation	process	over	the	last	number	of	years	deserves	reflection.	Engaging	in	what	has	
effectively	been	a	‘stock‐take’	of	agencies	has	yielded	important	information	about	the	scope	and	
form	of	 state	activities,	 and	how	savings	could	be	made	with	minimal	 impact	 to	services.	The	
process	of	‘stretching’	public	organisations	to	achieve	more	with	less	and	to	engage	in	mergers	or	
termination	 has	 also	 demonstrated	 considerable	 capacity	 to	 adapt	 to	 changed	 political	 and	
economic	 circumstances.	 	While	 senior	managers	 in	agencies	might	have	 learned	much	about	
managing	 organisations	 in	 turbulent	 times,	 there	 is	 scope	 for	 central	 government	 to	 capture	
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learning	 from	the	system‐wide	overhaul	that	has	occurred.	As	such	 future	reform	needs	to	be	
underpinned	by	a	process	of	reflection	that	allows	lessons	to	be	learnt	from	previous	processes	
of	reform.	This	reflection	should	be	conducted	outside	the	heat	and	political	short‐sightedness	
surrounding	general	election	campaigns,	and	 feed	 into	training	and	development	resources	to	
mitigate	the	effects	of	staff	turnover	and	consequent	loss	of	institutional	memory.	
Table	1:	Five	new	challenges	for	quango	reform	
	 Challenge	 Recent	Developments		 Ongoing	Relevance	
1	 Regulating		 New	 processes	 of	 regulation	
and	review	created	to	maintain	
reform	momentum		
	
Need	to	maintain	regulation	of	existing	and	
new	 bodies	 and	 expand	 regulation	 to	
include	 bodies	 at	 arm’s‐length	 beyond	
official	statistics	
2	 Managing	 New	focus	on	the	sponsorship	
of	agencies	
Need	 to	 entrench	 new	 management	
practices	and	be	sure	to	balance	autonomy	
and	control	
3	 Reconciling	 Reforms	 have	 divided	
administrative	 and	 political	
actors		
Need	to	foster	a	new	partnership	approach	
that	 recognizes	 the	 value	 of	 agencies	 and	
creates	a	sense	of	common	purpose	
4	 Co‐ordinating	 Greater	 diversity	 in	 the	 type	
and	 governance	 	 of	 arm’s‐
length	 bodies	 due	 to	 agency	
reform	 and	 wider	 process	 of	
government	rationalisation	
Need	 to	 coordinate	 activity	 across	 new	
boundaries	and	between	different	types	of	
organisation	
5	 Reflecting	 Significant	 reform	 effected	 at	
great	speed	
Need	 to	 learn	 lessons	 and	 reflect	 on	 the	
impact	 of	 reforms	 of	 the	 arm’s‐length	
landscape	as	a	whole	
	
Conclusions	
In	considering	the	future	of	public	bodies	reform	it	therefore	appears,	as	Francis	Maude	argued,	
that	reform	will	never	end.	Having	achieved	significant	progress	since	2010	the	UK	nevertheless	
faces	a	range	of	ongoing	challenges	that	arise	from	the	continued	diversity	of	the	public	bodies	
landscape.	There	are	indications	that	the	current	UK	Government	is	committed	to	driving	forward	
reform	in	this	area	in	calls	for	a	review	of	quango	classification	(Cabinet	Office,	2014d),	for	‘more	
strategic	relationships	between	public	bodies	and	departments’	and	for	a	‘strengthened	review	
programme	for	public	bodies’	(Cabinet	Office,	2014c).	Yet,	as	analysis	of	the	UK	and	Irish	cases	
show,	 delivering	 such	 objectives	 is	 by	 no	means	 simple	 as	 difficulties	 arising	 from	 legislative	
process	and	capacity	can	intercede	to	frustrate	the	ambition	of	reform.	In	considering	the	future	
of	quango	reform	it	 therefore	appears	 that	numerous	challenges	will	be	encountered	and	will	
have	to	be	overcome.	Building	on	Flinders	and	Skelcher’s	analysis	we	suggest	five	such	challenges	
best	captured	by	the	headings	‘regulating’,	‘managing’,	‘reconciling’,	‘co‐ordinating’	and	‘reflecting’	
that	should	inform	future	reform	of	the	quango	state.	
	
Looking	beyond	the	UK	it	is	clear	that	these	challenges	have	relevance	for	other	non‐Whitehall	
administrative	 systems.	 Post‐crisis	 governments	 around	 the	 world	 are	 faced	 with	 financial	
constraints	that	continue	to	inspire	programmes	of	reform	and	rationalisation,	and	yet	politicians	
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possess	limited	political	capital	with	which	to	launch	high	profile	programmes	of	reform	such	as	
that	 evident	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 2010.	 Such	 states	 need	 to	 develop	 new	 mechanisms	 that	 embed	
principles	of	reform	within	government	departments	and	agencies.	We	propose	that	processes	of	
regulating,	managing,	reconciling,	co‐ordinating	and	reflecting	can	assist	governments	seeking	to	
effect	ongoing	change.	For	this	reason	governments	around	the	world	can	draw	insight	from	the	
UK	and	Irish	cases	in	designing	and	implementing	future	programmes	of	quango	reform.		
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